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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; 
and RICHARD D. HAAS, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE APPELLATE RECORD 
AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37788-2010 
Ada County District Court No. 
2006-23517 
Ref. No. 11-15 
PRJ ON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a . ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES GROUP, ) 
INC. and DOES 1-10, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE APPELLATE RECORD AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE with Exhibits A and B attached was filed by counsel for Respondents on December 16, 2010. 
Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE APPELLATE 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this Court 
SHALL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE and the AUGMENTATION RECORD SHALL INCLUDE 
certified copies of these documents, copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Defendants Idaho Department of Correction, Thomas J. Beauclair, Richard D. Haas and 
Steven Wolfs Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement, inclusive of 
their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite 
Statement, both filed on August 7, 2006, in United States District Court Case No. 
CV 06-00039 (Electronic Case Filing ["ECF':] Docket No.6, with Attachment #1), attached 
as Exhibit A; and 
2. The Judgment entered on November 17,2006, in United States District Court Case No. 
CV 06-00039 (ECF Docket No. 33), attached as Exhibit B. 
DATED this ~t day of January 2011. 
For the Supreme. Court 
nON RECORD 151-ef~  
Stephen W. Kenyon, d~ 
cc: Counsel of Record 
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LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DAVID G. HIGH 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMILY A. MAC MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emily.macmaster0)ag.idaho.gov 
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Attorneys for State Defendants Idaho Department of Correction, 
Thomas J. Beauclair, Richard D. Haas and Steven Wolf 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
) 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) Case No. CV 06-00039 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; SECURE PHARMACY 
PLUS, INC., a subsidiary of AMERICAN 
SERVICES GROUP, INC.; RICHARD D. 
DULL; RODNEY D. HOLLIMAN; 
NORMA HERNANDEZ, JAN A BETH 
NICOLSON; VICTORIA M WEREMECKI; 
KAREN BARRETT; LISA MA YS; IDAHO 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; 
THOMAS J. BEAUCLAIR, Director; 
RICHARD D. HAAS, Medical Services 
Manager, STEVEN WOLF, Office of 
Professional Standards IDOC; and DOES \-
10. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
--------------~~=-=-------
DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTION, THOMAS J. 
BEAU CLAIR, RICHARD D. HAAS AND 
STEVEN WOLF'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT 
Certified to be a true and correct 
copy of original filed in my office. 
Elizabeth A. Smith, Clerk 
U.S. Courts, Distri<;;t of Idaho 
By Jill MacDonald 
Of) Cae 15, 2()1C 10:30 am 
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COME NOW Defendants Idaho Department of Correction, Thomas J. Beauclair, Richard 
D. Haas and Steven Wolf (collectively, the "State Defendants"), by and through their counsel of 
record, the Office of the Attorney General, and bring this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and (6) and hereby move the Court for an Order as to each ofthem dismissing 
the above-referenced lawsuit, in whole or in part, with prejudice. 
Additionally, the State Defendants bring this Motion for More Definite Statement, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), and hereby move the Court for an Order, if any part of this 
action is allowed to continue in federal court, requiring Plaintiff John F. Noak to amend the 
Complaint filed on January 30, 2006, to provide a more definite statement. 
This Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement is supported by 
Defendant Idaho Department of Correction, Thomas J. Beauclair, Richard D. Haas and Steven 
Wolfs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement, 
filed herewith, and the pleadings on file in this action. 
DATED this 7th day of August, 2006. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE A TIORNEY GENERAL 
Bylsf EmilyA. Mac Master 
EMILY A. MAcMASTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this 7th day of August, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing 
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM!ECF system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing 
to the following: 
Lois Weston Hart 
GROBER & HART 
loishartlawyer@cableone.net 
lsi EmilyA. Mac Master 
EMILY A. MAc MASTER 
DEFENDANT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, THOMAS J. BEAU CLAIR, 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
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DAVID G. HIGH 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMILY A. MAc MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
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Statehouse, Room 210 
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COME NOW Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"), Thomas J. Beauclair 
("Beauclair), Richard D. Haas ("Haas") and Steven Wolf ("Wolf') (collectively, "the State 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT - 1 
Case 1 :06-cv-00039-BLW Document 6-1 Filed 08/07/06 Page 2 of 18 
Defendants"), by and through their legal counsel, the Office of the Idaho Attorney General, and 
hereby present this memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for a More 
Definite Statement, each filed concurrently herewith. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiff John F. Noak, M.D. ("Plaintiff') alleges federal diversity 
jurisdiction and attempts to characterize state law claims as alleged violations of federal law. On 
the face of the Complaint, however, this lawsuit is not properly brought in federal court. 
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was an employee of Defendant Prison Health 
Services, Inc. ("PHS"). Plaintiff claims that, as a PHS employee, he provided physician services 
at IDOC facilities pursuant to a contract between PHS and IDOC. Plaintiff alleges that on March 
10, 2004, after an incident involving his physical handling of a female prisoner, IDOC asserted 
its rights under the IDOCIPHS contract and requested that PHS replace Plaintiffs services. 
Plaintiff's lawsuit is against PHS, the State Defendants and a number of other 
Defendants. In Counts I, V, VI and VIII of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a variety of state law 
tort claims against the State Defendants, alleging that they defamed Plaintiff, interfered with his 
alleged employment with PHS, acted wrongfully in investigations of his conduct and committed 
trespass. In Counts II and IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges federal claims against the State 
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 (2) and (3). 
The gist of Count II is that the State Defendants allegedly defamed him and interfered with his 
employment with PHS. The gist of Count IV is that the State Defendants allegedly delayed in 
reporting Plaintiffs conduct to law enforcement and interfered in interviews conducted. 
This Motion to Dismiss should be granted for the following reasons: 
• There is no diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
• There is no federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 133 I 
because; (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the State Defendants under 42 U.S.C. 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
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§ 2000e (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964); (2) the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against IDOC and Beauclair, Haas and 
Wolf in their official capacities; (3) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
for alleged violations of Title VII, or the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to 
state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U .S.C. §§ 1985(2) or (3). 
• As there is no basis for federal diversity or federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims should be dismissed. The proper forum for this lawsuit 
is state, not federal, court. If, however, any part of this federal lawsuit is allowed to continue, 
Plaintiff should be required to provide a more definite statement than his 118-page Complaint. 
II. 
MATERIAL RELEVANT FACTS 
Following is a summary of the material factual allegations in the Complaint: 1 
1. Plaintiff resides in Idaho and is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. IDOC is a 
subdivision of the State ofIdaho. Beauclair, Haas, Wolf and several other individual Defendants 
reside in Idaho or resided in Idaho during the relevant time periods. Complaint", 7, 10, 12-20. 
2. From approximately 2001 through July 1,2005, PHS was the contractual provider 
of medical services for prisoners in IDOC facilities. Complaint", 7, 183. 
3. In or about April 2002, PHS offered Plaintiff a job as a doctor for PHS at an 
IDOC facility. On or about October 1, 2002, Plaintiff became the PHS Medical Director. PHS 
governed and controlled the terms, conditions, rights and privileges of Plaintiffs alleged 
employment. Complaint", 7,24-25. 
4. On or about January 28, 2004, Defendant Norma Hernandez, an rooc prisoner, 
sought medical treatment. Defendant lana Nicholson treated Ms. Hernandez and consulted with 
1 The State Defendants disagree with many of the factual allegations made in the 
Complaint. However, solely for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the facts must be liberally 
construed in Plaintiffs favor and assumed to be true. 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
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Plaintiff by phone and used an "escalated demanding voice tone." Complaint", 12, 32-41. 
5. On or about January 30, 2004, Plaintiff provided follow-up treatment to 
Ms. Hernandez. As Ms. Hernandez left the exam room, she felt that she was going to faint. Ms. 
Nicholson began to help Ms. Hernandez to use the wall to slide down. Plaintiff claims that he 
"smoothly stepped in between" Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Nicholson and walked Ms. Hernandez 
back down the hallway to her room. Ms. Nicholson became very angry. Complaint", 42-52. 
Other witnesses have reported the incident differently, as discussed below. 
6. Later that day, Ms. Hernandez filed a complaint with moc, alleging that Plaintiff 
had grabbed her by the arm and pushed Ms. Nicholson to the side, then forced Ms. Hernandez to 
walk back to her room with no concern for her health or wellbeing. Complaint", 53-57. 
7. moc's Office of Professional Standards initiated an investigation of the incident. 
The Ada County Sheriff's Office (HAC SO"), PHS, and the Idaho Board of Medicine also 
conducted investigations. Complaint", 58-98, 104-111, 121-122, 130-153, 158, 166, 174. 
8. On or about February 12, 2004, Plaintiff was escorted off moc premises, and 
PHS placed Plaintiff on administrative leave with pay. Complaint", 99-101,111-114. 
9. In a memorandum to Haas' supervisor dated February 13, 2004, Ha~s allegedly 
wrote regarding the PHS investigation: «Regarding the review by the [PHS] attorney/nurse, I 
expressed moc's concerns that PHS's proposed review could appear to violate state statutes 
related to intimidation of witnesses and impeding a criminal investigation." Complaint" 115. 
10. On February 16,2004, Beauclair held a meeting with all Boise-area PHS contract 
employees. Complaint, 1 116. 
11. On or about February 24, 2004, ACSO recommended to the Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney that a warrant be sought for Plaintiffs arrest (for alleged battery). The 
Prosecuting Attorney declined prosecution of the case. Complaint," 62,92, 118, 125. 
12. On March 10, 2004, PHS notified Plaintiff that lDOC was requesting a 
replacement for Plaintiff, to provide services at moc facilities. Complaint", 126-128. 
13. On April 9, 2004, the Idaho Statesman published an article of an interview of 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
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Beauclair in which Beauclair allegedly complained about communication and accountability 
issues with PHS and announced that moc had launched three separate investigations into 
employees of PHS. Complaint", 162-]63. 
14. On May 6, 2004, the DEA certificates and unused 222 forms issued to Plaintiff 
were returned to an Idaho Board of Pharmacy representative and it was confirmed that Plaintiffs 
unused prescription pads were destroyed. Complaint,'1 159-16], 167-169, 175. 
15. On June 9,2004, the Board of Medicine sent a letter of concern to Plaintiff, citing 
his lack of control and judgment in interactions with difficult patients. Complaint, 1 176. 
m. 
STANDARDS TO GRANT A MOTION TO DISMISS 
The State Defendants are entitled to a dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the complaint "faiJ[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," i.e., 
this rule "authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326,109 S. Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). All 
well-pleaded facts in a complaint should be accepted as true and construed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006). In 
considering a motion to dismiss, a complaint should not be dismissed on the pleadings "unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief." Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). In 
evaluating a complaint, any doubts should be construed in favor of the pleader. Id. 
The factual allegations of a complaint must be accepted as true when considering a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, but neither defendants nor the court are bound by legal conclusions cast by a 
complaint as allegations offact. Papasan v. Allain. 478 U.S. 265, 285, 106 S. Ct. 2932,2944,92 
L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Also, a liberal interpretation may not supply essential elements of a claim that have not been 
pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents ofthe University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Does Not Have Diversity Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
The Complaint alleges federal diversity jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332. Complaint" 2. 28 U.S.C. § I 332(a)(1 ) grants diversity jurisdiction only where 
plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of different states. The statute requires complete diversity 
of citizenship. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). "The 
diversity jurisdiction statute, as construed for nearly 200 years, requires that to bring a diversity 
case in federal court amongst mUltiple defendants, each plaintiff must be diverse from each 
defendant." Lee v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
There is no federal diversity jurisdiction in this case. 100C is a state agency and thus is 
not a citizen. Complaint" 17. Accordingly, 100C and Plaintiff are not citizens of different 
states. "If a party is not a citizen of a state at all, then it is not a citizen of a different state and it 
would be inappropriate to allow that party to bring a case or be subject to federal jurisdiction 
based only on diversity of citizenship." Batton v. Georgia Gulf, 261 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (M.D. 
La. 2003) (presence of state agency as a codefendant destroyed diversity). See also Beck v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 62 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding inclusion of a Montana 
state agency destroyed diversity jurisdiction); Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 416 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no diversity jurisdiction, absent dismissal of the District of Columbia). 
Second, there is no complete diversity between Plaintiff and each individual Defendant. 
Plaintiff alleges he and several individual Defendants are residents of Idaho. Complaint", 7, 
12, 16, 18-20. On these alleged facts, there is no basis for federal diversity jurisdiction. 
B. Plaintiffs Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) Against the State Defendants Should 
Be Dismissed 
Counts II and IV of the Complaint allege violations of 42 U.S.c. § 2000(e), which 
codifies Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits unlawful discrimination in 
employment relationships; Title VII does not protect independent contractor relationships like 
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the one here between IDOC and Plaintiff. Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 
883-84 (9th Cir. 1980). However, a Title VII claim can be stated if a defendant's actions 
interfered with the plaintiffs employment with another employer. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 351 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 2003) (to 
state interference claim, defendant must have some "peculiar control" over the plaintiff's 
employment with the direct employer and engage in "discriminatory interference"). 
As pled in the Complaint, PHS (not IDOC) was Plaintiffs employer. Complaint, 17. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs Title VII claim against the State Defendants must be stated, if at all, as an 
interference claim. However, this claim fails on the allegations in the Complaint. 
First, to establish the court's jurisdiction over a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust 
his administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 
1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). "Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative 
remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission] or the appropriate state agency, thereby affording the agency an opportunity to 
investigate the charge." Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Where a plaintiff does not plead that 
he has exhausted his administrative remedies under Title VII, his complaint should be dismissed. 
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,626 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 
or the Idaho Human Rights Commission. Unless Plaintiff pleads that he exhausted his 
administrative remedies (which, in fact, he has not), his Title VII claims should be dismissed. 
Second, Plaintiff cannot state a Title VII claim against Beauclair, Haas or Wolf. Title VII 
does not impose individual liability. Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology. 339 F.3d 
1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Third, Title vn prohibits employment discrimination against an individual because of his 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servo Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 78, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1». 
Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an individual because he opposed unlawful 
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discrimination or participated in proceedings governed by Title VII. Learned v. City of 
Bellevue, 860 F.2d 927, 931-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing Title VII's opposition and 
participation clauses at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3). To plead a Title VII claim, a plaintiff need not 
plead a prima facie case but must at least plead a "short and plain statement of his claim showing 
that he is entitled to relief." Ortez v. Washington County. 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996). 
In the Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that he was discriminated against because 
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or that he engaged in a protected activity under 
Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, this claim should be dismissed. 
C. The Eleventh Amendment Bars Plaintiffs 42 U.S.c. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 
Claims Against moc and Beauclair, Haas and Wolf in Their Official Capacities 
In Counts II and IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against the State 
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.c. §§ 1985(2) and (3). However, the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution bars these claims. 
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to a state against an individual's lawsuit 
for money damages, absent that state's consent. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
54, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits 
for money damages against states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Will v. 
Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58,64-67,71,109 S. ct. 2304, 2308-10, 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 
(1989). States and state officials are not "persons" subject to money damage claims within the 
meaning of these civil rights statutes. Id. 
In the Complaint's plea for relief on Counts II and IV, Plaintiff seeks money damages -
compensatory damages, nominal damages, costs and attorneys fees. Complaint, Relief 
Requested (Count II (, c), Count IV (, a». The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs claims for 
money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.c. § 1985 against moc, a state agency. 
The Eleventh Amendment further bars lawsuits for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 or 42 U .S.c. § 1985 brought against state officials acting in their official capacities. Will 
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v. Michigan State Police, 49] U.S. at 64, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304 at 2308, 2312. A suit against a 
state official in his "official capacity" is actually a suit against the state. Cortez v. County of Los 
Angeles, 294 FJd 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Beauclair, Haas and Wolf in their official capacities? 
D. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Counts II and IV of Plaintiffs Complaint contain claims for violations of federal law 
under 42 U.S.c. § 1983. This statute provides in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory reliefwas unavailable. 
42 U.S.c. § 1983 "'is not itselfa source of substantive rights; but merely provides 'a method for 
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. '" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 
S. Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citation om itted). To state a claim under 42 U .S.c. 
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States; and (2) that the alleged violator acted under the color of state law. Long y. 
County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 
III 
2 On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.c. § 1985 claims 
against Beauclair, Haas or Wolf are only in their official capacities. The caption of the 
Complaint names these three individuals specifically in their job capacities with moc. 
Additionally, in the text of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants acted as the 
agents, servants and/or employees ofIDOC and that IDOC is liable for their actions pursuant to 
ratification, respondeat superior, actual and/or implied agency and apparent authority. 
Complaint, , 1. See Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
where a defendant is sued in his individual capacity for acting outside of the scope of his 
authority but under color of law, his state employer cannot be held liable on a respondeat 
superior theory). 
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Even if the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
in their entirety, the Complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as discussed below. 
1. Plaintiff Cannot State Claims Under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Arising Out 
of the Same Rights 
To the extent that Counts II and rv allege violations of Title vn as a federal statutory 
basis for Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail as a matter of 
law. "Violation of rights created by Title VII cannot form the basis of section 1983 claims." 
Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d at 933. "[A] plaintiff must 'have an independent basis for 
claims outside of Title VII, 'lest Congress' prescribed remedies under Title VII be undermined. ", 
Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 587 (lOth Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Count II of the Complaint alleges violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out 
of the same facts. Complaint, ~~ 194-20 I. Count IV does the same. Complaint,~, 205-208. To 
the extent that Plaintiff asserts violations of Title VII as the basis for his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims, his § 1983 claims should be dismissed. 
2. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a 42 U.S.c. § 1983 Claim Against the State 
Defendants Based Upon the Equal Protection Clause 
In Counts II and IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff pleads a claim under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 
based upon alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 3 But neither Count states a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The Equal Protection Clause requires states to treat persons similarly situated alike. See 
Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). To state this claim, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendants "acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the 
plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." If a suspect class is not involved, the 
state's action is reviewed under rational basis review, which requires a mere "rational relation to 
some legitimate end." Brandwein v. The California Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners, 708 F.2d 
3 The equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment apply to the federal 
government; the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the states. 
Abdul-Adbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307,316 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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1466,1470 (9th Cir. 1983); Tucson Woman's Clinic, 379 F.3d 531, 543 (9th Cir. 2004). 
In Counts II and IV, Plaintiff does not allege membership in any particular class. In the 
factual allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff does claim that Haas wanted the State of Idaho to 
return to "in-house medical services" and to get "private medical contractors fired." Complaint, 
~, 18, 30, 195. Assuming Plaintiffs membership in a class of private physicians is the basis for 
his equal protection claim, the State Defendants' actions are subject to mere rational basis 
review. Brandwein, 708 F.2d at 1470, Tucson Woman's Clinic, 379 F.3d at 545. 
Rational basis review is easily satisfied on the allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiff fails 
to allege that any treatment of state-employed physicians occurred that was more favorable than 
treatment of PHS private physicians. Put plainly, Plaintiff has not alleged any discriminatory 
treatment. Also, Haas' alleged intent to bring medical services back "in-house" cannot support 
an equal protection claim. Under Plaintiffs rationale, a state agency could never terminate 
outside contracts to bring work back "in-house" without violating the United States Constitution. 
On the allegations in the Complaint, IDOC's request that PHS replace Plaintiff was 
furthermore rationally related to a legitimate end - IDOC's concern about Plaintiffs handling 
of a prisoner and his interactions with medical staff, as documented in witness statements. 
Complaint, ~, 58-59, 127-128. On the face of the complaint, the Board of Medicine and ACSO 
were similarly concerned about Plaintiffs actions - the Board of Medicine issued a letter of 
concern and ACSO referred the matter for criminal prosecution. Complaint", 62, 92, 118, 125, 
176. In sum, Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based upon the Equal Protection Clause fails. 
3. Plaintiffs Breach of Contract and Defamation Claims Do Not Rise to the Level of 
Constitutional Violations Under the Due Process Clause 
Plaintiff alleges that he was an employee of PHS, which had a contract with IDOC to 
provide medical services. Complaint,~, 7, 24-25. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that IDOC 
violated his due process rights by interfering with his at-will employment with PHS. 
/// 
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Plaintiff cannot state a claim for a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
based upon the PHSIIDOC contract. To begin with, not every interference with a government 
contract constitutes a deprivation of a protected property interest. San Bernardino Physicians' 
Services Medical Group v. County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987). "It 
is neither workable nor within the intent of section 1983 to convert every breach of contract 
claim against a state into a federal claim." Id. Also, an interest in private employment does not 
rise to the level of a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1409-10. 
In San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected a due process claim arising out of a county medical center's termination of a 
physicians' services contract. Id. at 1410. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that they had 
employment rights at stake that were akin to public employment rights. Id. at 1409-10. 
San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group is on point. Here, Plaintiff alleges 
that the State Defendants wrongfully interfered with his employment by PHS. However, 
Plaintiff's alleged private employment relationship with PHS does not create a property interest 
akin to public employment. IDOC's request that PHS replace Plaintiff's services at IDOC 
facilities under the PHSIIDOC contract does not implicate any property interest sufficient to 
support Plaintiff's claim for violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The allegations in the Complaint also do not implicate a liberty interest or any other 
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff alleges that the State 
Defendants made defamatory statements and wrongfully interfered with his employment with 
PHS. However, defamatory statements do not, by themselves, establ ish a cause of action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1976). 
Additionally, the loss of private employment due to defamation does not implicate a liberty 
interest. See Pendleton v. City of Haverhil I, 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1 st Cir. 1998). Likewise, damage 
to the reputation of a private business alone does not rise to the level of a constitutionally 
protected interest. WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999). To 
hold otherwise "would constitutionalize the state law tort of defamation ... " Id. 
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Thus, neither Plaintiffs loss of alleged private employment with PHS due to alleged 
defamatory statements nor Plaintiffs claim that alleged defamatory statements harmed his 
business reputation as a physician, without more, are enough to implicate a liberty interest or 
fundamental right protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim should be dismissed. 
E. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Bring Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) or (3) 
In Counts II and IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants engaged 
in conspiracies to violate his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.c. §§ 1985(2) and (3). 
These sections of the statute provide: 
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror 
lftwo or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, 
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from 
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, 
fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on 
account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence. the verdict, 
presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to 
injure such juror in his person or prpperty on account of any verdict, presentment, 
or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such 
juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, 
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or 
Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to 
injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the 
right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws; 
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges 
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise 
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection ofthe 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of 
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from 
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal 
protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, 
intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his 
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any 
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a 
Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or 
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set 
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be 
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is 
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injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right 
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may 
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or 
deprivation, against anyone or more ofthe conspirators. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3). Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims fail, as a matter oflaw. 
1. Plaintiff Has Not Pled a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) or (3) With the 
Requisite Specificity 
"To state a claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, 'the plaintiff must state 
specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy. '" Olsen v. Idaho State Board of 
Medicine, 363 F.3d 916,929 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Bums v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 
821 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff must show an agreement, or "meeting of the minds," to violate 
constitutional rights. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 
1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989). The claim must "allege facts to support the allegation that defendants 
conspired together." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d at 626 (upholding 
dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, where the complaint contained "legal conclusions but no 
specification of any facts to support the claim of conspiracy"). 
Counts II and N of the Complaint allege mere legal conclusions to support Plaintiffs 
claim ofa conspiracy by the State Defendants. Complaint", 194-201,205-08. Plaintiff has not 
alleged specific facts to support his claim that the State Defendants conspired and reached a 
meeting of the minds to violate his constitutional rights. Absent the requisite specificity, 
Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and (3) should be dismissed. 
2. Plaintiff Does Not Satisfy the Standing Requirement for a Claim Under 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1985(2) 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) there was 
a conspiracy, (2) to deter a witness by force, intimidation, or threat from attending court or 
testifYing freely in any pending matter, which (3) results in injury to him. See David v. United 
States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. J 987). 
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged the essential elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(2). Plaintiff does not allege that any attendance or testimony was required of any witness 
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in any court proceeding. Instead, there was no court testimony because, as Plaintiff alleges, no 
criminal charge against him was prosecuted. Complaint" 125. As no witness was deterred 
from attending court or testifYing by force, intimidation or threat, Plaintiff did not suffer any 
injury within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). 
To the extent that Plaintiff intends to state his 42 U.S.c. § 1985(2) claims based upon 
alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause, those claims fail for the reasons discussed 
above in this brief. See also Olson v. Idaho State Board of Medicine, 363 F.3d at 930 
(dismissing claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based upon the plaintiffs failure to state a cognizable 
claim under 42 U.S.c. § 1983). 
3. Plaintiff Does Not Satisfy the Standing Requirements for a Claim Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
To meet the standing requirements for an action under 42 U.S.c. § 1985(3), a plaintiff 
must demonstrate "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory 
animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S. Ct. 
1790, 1798, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1971). In the Ninth Circuit, treatment of 42 U.S.c. § 1985(3) is 
extended beyond race "only when the class in question can show that there has been a 
governmental determination that its members 'require and warrant special federal assistance in 
protecting their civil rights. '" Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted); see also Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, -1403 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Nowhere in Plaintiff's Complaint does he allege that he has been discriminated against 
because of his race or that he otherwise belongs to a protected class within the meaning of the 
statute. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See also Olson v. Idaho 
State Board of Medicine, 363 F.3d at 930 (dismissing claim under 42 U.S.c. § 1985, where no 
cognizable claim was stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
F. Plaintiffs Supplemental State Claims Should Be Dismissed Based Upon the Lack of 
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff has also brought supplemental state claims before this Court pursuant to 28 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT - 15 
Case 1 :06-cv-00039-BLW Document 6-1 Filed 08/07/06 Page 16 of 18 
U.S.C. § 1367(a), which allows a federal district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
state law claims that are so related to the federal claims in the action that they form part of the 
same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction. In such a circumstance, the court's exercise of discretion to retain supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state claims is balanced with the underlying objective of most sensibly 
accommodating the values of economy, cQ{1venience, fairness and comity. O'Connor v. State of 
Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 362 (9th Cir. 1994). Where a plaintiffs federal law claims are eliminated 
before trial, these values generally point toward declining jurisdiction over the remaining state 
law claims. Id. at 363. See also Medrano v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1506 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940,113 S. Ct. 2415, 124 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1993). 
Here, Plaintiffs federal claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 
Plaintiffs state law claims against the State Defendants should be dismissed, particularly as this 
federal lawsuit is at an early stage. The proper forum for Plaintiffs claims is the state court 
system, not federal court. 
G. Plaintiff Should Be Required to Replace His 118-Page Complaint With a More 
Definite Statement of His Claims, Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) 
This federal action should be dismissed in its entirety. If, however, Plaintiff is allowed to 
maintain any part of this action in federal court, he should be required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
l2(e) to replace his lIS-page Complaint with an amended complaint that provides a short, 
definite statement of his claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) allows a party to move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading if a complaint is so vague or ambiguous that a 
party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. 
The standard for pleading a definite statement is provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. S(a)(2), 
which requires a plaintiff to give a "short and plain statement" of his claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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8(e)(1) further requires that "[e]ach avennent of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." 
See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding dismissal of a 
43-page complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), where the complaint was replete with 
redundancy, argument and irrelevant allegations); Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 226 F.R.D. 395, 
397 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Martinez v. Snow, No. CV-F-04-6285-AWI, 2005 WL 1899513, **5-6 
(E.D. Cal. August 5, 2005). 
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is 118 pages - the factual allegations alone are 184 
paragraphs. The Complaint is replete with a lengthy factual narrative, legal arguments and 
irrelevant facts such as the "independent medical judgment" of physicians and Plaintiff's alleged 
accomplishments. Complaint, ~~ 18-19, 24-31. Plaintiff's 118-page Complaint would impose a 
hefty burden upon the State Defendants to form a paragraph-by-paragraph answer. 
Additionally, despite the Complaint's extensive factual narrative, Plaintiff fails to connect 
the alleged facts to Counts I, II, IV, V, VI and VIII in a manner sufficient to provide the State 
Defendants with notice of his legal claims. Tn Count I, Plaintiff pleads claims for defamation, 
defamation per se and false light but fails to identifY which alleged statements referred to in the 
184 paragraphs offactual allegations are allegedly defamatory or place him in a false light. 
It is not up to the State Defendants to guess which statements fonn the basis of Plaintiff's 
defamation claims. See Freeman v. Bechtel Construction Co., 87 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 
1996) ("unless the complaints set forth the alleged defamatory statements ... Bechtel is unable 
'to form responsive pleadings"'); Nanavati, M.D. v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 
96,109 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("a plaintiff must be required to set forth allegedly actionable statements 
with particularity"); Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 596 F.2d 692, 698 (8th Cir. 1979) (notice of 
the exact language used is necessary to form a responsive pleading to a defamation claim). 
Similarly, identification of the alleged statements is needed for the Defendants to respond 
to Plaintiff's false light claims. Under Idaho law, an invasion of privacy claim may be stated 
upon "publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye." Hoskins v. Howard, 
132 Idaho 311, 316, 971 P.2d 1135, 1140 (1999). Unless Plaintiff identifies the alleged 
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wrongful statements, the Defendants cannot determine whether they placed Plaintiff in a false 
light or whether there was a public disclosure. 
Therefore, if Plaintiff is allowed to maintain any part of this action in federal court, he 
should be required to replace the l18-page Complaint with an amended complaint that provides a 
concise and more definite statement of his claims and identifies, with specificity, each alleged 
statement that Plaintiff claims support his state law defamation, false light and other tort claims. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, each of the State Defendants respectfully requests an 
order from the Court dismissing the Complaint as to them, with prejudice. Should any part of 
Plaintiffs action against the State Defendants be allowed to continue in federal court, the State 
Defendants request that Plaintiff be required to amend the Complaint to provide a more definite 
statement. 
DATED this 7th day of August, 2006. 
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